• Author : Chiwon Choi
• Publication : Zeitschrift der Koreanisch-Deutschen Gesellschaft fuer Sozialwissenschaften
• Publisher : Koreanisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer Sozialwissenschaften(K-G Association For Social Sciences)
• Volume : 33(4)
• Date : December 2023

A ‘class-conscious bourgeois’ as citizen, Max Weber’s politics of civil society is a product of the political-practical attempt to overcome the crisis of Historismus. In the most comprehensive sense, it provides a new ‘Historie’ which corresponds to that of Marx and Nietzsche who are responsible for the crisis of Historismus. It internalizes methods of Marx and Nietzsche, which Historismus couldn’t provide. Above all, although Weber was a ‘child of the historical school,’ he accepts the critical problematique of Hegel and especially Marx: His concept of politics of civil society attempts to preserve the value and meaning of politics in respond to the demands of the times by requestinf a reexamination of the entire Bilder of the existing Historie. His unique ‘source’ of thoughts, which opens a new perspective on society and politics, has its specific content in his concept of politics of civil society. His concept is not related to the traditions of natural rights theory or social contract theory, which equated civil society with political society, nor should it be understood as the product of a naive political interpretation based on the religious ego or self and mentality. A concept of politics of civil society captured not only by moral ethics (voluntarism) based on the ego-idea of Parsonianized Weber but also by a creative individualism in the manner of Tocqueville and Mill, which furthermore is colored by Verba’s ‘civic culture’ and Putnam’s ‘social capital’, vulgarizes, simplifies and misleads Weber’s thoughts. In the academic and intellectual climate of the United States, such Parsonianized romantic version of politics of civil society may be possible. At best, such concept only results in the politics of civil society as Zivilgesellschaft, which has nothing to do with Weber. Weber, with his theoretical and practical cool-headedness, however, would not accept such naive and lax concept of politics of civil society as an ‘Americanized version of Romanticism’.

• Author : Jiil Kim
• Publication : Strategic Studies
• Publisher : Korea Research Institute for Strategy
• Volume : 30(3)
• Date : November 2023

What is the reason behind the unwavering commitment of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to expanding North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and resisting nuclear disarmament? To address the aforementioned research question, this study delves into the core psychological factors shaping Kim’s mindset and consequent behavioral patterns. Utilizing the documentary research method, this study endeavors to illuminate the research inquiries by employing the psychological framework of ‘historical trauma’ to dissect Kim Jong Un’s behavioral tendencies, which have manifested during denuclearization negotiations. The findings of this study reveal that Kim Jong Un bears a historical trauma inherited, through a process of ‘transference,’ from his grandfather Kim Il Sung, who initiated the Korean War. Specifically, Kim Jong Un’s historical trauma encompasses both ‘short-term war trauma’ and ‘alliance trauma.’ Within this context, the short-term trauma significantly contributes to Kim Jong Un’s reluctance to commit to denuclearization. Furthermore, these two forms of trauma have manifested as his deceptive maneuvers during denuclearization negotiations and his endeavors to undermine the military might of enemy alliances while persuading North Korea’s allies to align with his nation.

• Author : Sangsoo Lim
• Publication : Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies
• Publisher : Institute of Global Affairs
• Volume : 30(3)
• Date : September 2023

Abstract: Recent events including rapid nuclear modernization of North Korea and China and increasing fear of nuclear escalation in Ukraine have led to renewed attention to nuclear politics in East Asia. In this context, this paper aims to address one of the most distinguished concepts in nuclear politics and its relevance to East Asia’s security environment: the stability-instability paradox. Specifically, this paper seeks to address the two following questions. Is the stability-instability paradox applicable to the inter-Korean security environment? If so, by what mechanism will the stability-instability paradox work in the region? Through theoretical analysis and a case study on the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, this paper yields two findings. First, while not yet fully applicable, the logic of the stability-instability paradox is increasingly becoming relevant in the inter-Korean security environment. Second, the stability-instability paradox in the region is likely to work through the mechanism of the ‘red-line model’, which entails relatively little danger of intentional nuclear escalation.

• Author : EunBi Lee, Seung Joon Paik
• Publication : National Strategy
• Publisher : The Sejong Institute
• Volume : 29(3)
• Date : August 2023

Abstract: This study examines the sudden deterioration of the Sino-ROK relationship following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. We argue that the unrealistic expectations the two countries’ top leaders had for one another contributed to the rift. While Seoul expected China to take harsh measures against North Korea to end its nuclear program, Beijing expected South Korea to align with China’s strategic interests and distance itself from its longtime ally, the U.S. Although these expectations had contributed to a period of positive relations between the two countries since 2013, they were at odds with the core security interests of the two countries and therefore were not sustainable. When the two failed to fulfill each other’s expectations after the North Korean nuclear test, policymakers in Seoul and Beijing felt betrayed and responded with punitive measures that significantly harmed their relationship. We conclude with policy recommendations for a more prudent approach to security cooperation based on common interests.

• Author : Sangsoo Lim
• Publication : East Asian Studies
• Publisher : Sogang Institute for East Asian Studies
• Volume : 42(2)
• Date : August 2023

Abstract: Japan adopted a series of policies in 1971 that came to be known as the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’, outlining that Japan will not produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles featured an exceptionally high degree of non-proliferation commitment when compared to other states, and they have remained the backbone of Japanese nuclear policy to the present day. Then, what factors motivated Japan to adopt a set of unique non-nuclear policies such as the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1971? To answer this question, this paper examined the normative background of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, with an emphasis on the norms that motivated the domestic actors in Japan at the time. The findings show that the following four distinct norms in Japan motivated the domestic actors to advocate the adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in 1971: 1) Japan’s non-nuclear norms, 2) Japan’s anti-war norms, 3) regional norms in Okinawa, 4) conservative norms in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership.

• Author : Chiwon Choi
• Publication : Politics & Public Opinion
• Publisher : The Korean Association for Political Criticism
• Volume : 32
• Date : June 2023

Populism becomes an indicator that can track changes in the meaning of democracy, reflecting the political reality. Populism is not an irrational political phenomenon, a corrupted form of democratic politics or mobocracy. It is not an irrational political phenomenon lacking ideological values. And it is not a mirage that exists in philosophical speculation. The origin of the behavior of Korean intellectuals, scholars, journalists, and politicians misusing populism is found in the anti-communist intellectual·academic climate of the United States, which tried to defend so-called liberal democracy during the Cold War. These Korean ‘mass information purveyors’ are obscuring the essence of the problem by constantly producing information that blurs and distorts the criteria of truth and lies. The problem with scholars who uncritically accept and disseminate this information is serious. In short, a vested class of intellectuals, scholars, journalists, and politicians united around the mainstream media as core ‘mass information purveyor’ abuses populism, the best political concept and means, for the purpose of retaining its own ideological and material interests while continuing the anti-communist worldview and covering up the reproduction of socioeconomic inequality. It is necessary to strengthen the capacity of politically mature citizens to bear the weight of this irrationality.

• Author : Hyun-Jin Cha
• Publication : Korea Observer
• Publisher :  Institute of Korean Studies
• Volume : 54(2)
• Date : June 2023

Abstract: This paper aims to analyze how the traits of candlelight protest participants have changed from 2004 to 2017 in South Korea. While previous studies have typically identified these traits of the candlelight protesters based on a single survey, this paper examines the change of protest participants using a multi-level analysis. This study argues that voter type and election cycles have a significant impact on an individual’s decision to participate in candlelight protests. To be specific, swing voters are less likely to participate in a candlelight protest when the next election is scheduled either too soon or too far. Core liberal voters with a high degree of motivation are more likely to take part in a candlelight protest when the distance from the next election is close, while core conservative voters with a low degree of motivation are not affected by the distance from the next election. This study contributes on both sub-fields, voting behaviors and contentious politics, by combining individuals’ voting patterns with political opportunity structures. Survey data (2004, 2010, 2017) conducted by the Korean Political Science Association (KPSA) and the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSSDC) provide empirical support for the arguments.

• Author : Inwook Kim, Seung Joon Paik
• Publication : Korean Political Science Review
• Publisher : The Korean Political Science Association
• Volume : 57(2)
• Date : June 2023

The possibility of nuclear arms control with North Korea, which was previously deemed implausible and unacceptable, is gaining traction among analysts and policymakers. What is missing, however, is proper engagement with theories of nuclear arms control and studies about its relevance to asymmetric nuclear relationships. This paper seeks to fill this gap by first distinguishing between structural and operational arms control, elucidating their rationale, organizing principles, and expected outcomes. Second, because nuclear asymmetry defines and dominates the US-North Korea nuclear tension, structural nuclear arms control is practically impossible to design and politically too costly. On the other hand, nuclear asymmetry exacerbates crisis stability problem, and operational nuclear arms control can provide meaningful crisis management mechanisms with relatively acceptable cost.

• Author : Sunwoo Paek, Dong Sun Lee
• Publication : Diplomacy & Statecraft
• Publisher : Taylor & Francis
• Volume : 34(1)
• Date : April 2023

Abstract: This article explains the US curtailment of South Korean nuclear development by attributing this success primarily to the inducements President Ronald Reagan offered. These inducements were reliable because the US as a superpower operating under bipolarity, cared about its reputation as a trustworthy ally and was eager to provide inducements to its interest-sharing client. The inducements exposed Seoul to only a small risk of subordination, given the US’s position as a remote patron. By contrast, the sanctions Reagan’s predecessors threatened to impose were marginally effective, and could only delay Seoul’s nuclear pursuit because geographical remoteness gave them modest credibility.