• Author : Kim Young Joon, Shin Young Hwan
• Publication : National Security and Strategy
• Publisher : Institute for National Security Strategy
• Volume : 21(3)
• Date : September, 2021

Abstract: The aim of this study is to understand Biden administration’s foreign policy principles and problems. This paper analyzed Biden administration’s official documents and speeches made by President Biden and Secretary Blinken regarding foreign policy. This paper claims that Biden administration’s foreign policy is built on four major principles; rebuilding relations with international community through diplomacy, pursuing progressive policy agenda, selective intervention, and China policy layered by competition and cooperation. This study identified four policy tasks for Biden administrations to resolve in order to achieve its foreign policy goals. They are managing diplomatic relations with authoritarian countries, internal dilemma of pursing progressive policy agenda, dealing with morality of America’s place in the world, and finding equilibrium in its relations with China.

• Author : Dong Sun Lee, Iordanka Alexandrova
• Publication : International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
• Publisher : Oxford University Press
• Volume : 21(3)
• Date : September, 2021

Abstract: What nuclear strategy has North Korea adopted? What factors have driven the development of this nuclear strategy? This article examines the key attributes of Pyongyang’s nuclear program to offer possible answers to these questions of scholarly and practical importance. It argues that North Korea has likely adopted an assured retaliation strategy, threatening a nuclear second strike to deter US nuclear attacks. This strategy was chosen due to its superior feasibility and desirability: it requires only a modest cost-effective nuclear arsenal, reduces Pyongyang’s security dependence on Beijing, permits politically safe centralized control over the nuclear weapons, and is also relatively economical. This article calls into question the common views that North Korea has employed a catalytic strategy using its nuclear capabilities to induce China’s assistance, and that Pyongyang is developing an asymmetric escalation strategy or a brinkmanship strategy, which utilizes nuclear weapons primarily to counter the superior conventional forces of its adversaries.

• Author : Sung Eun Kim & Sujin Cha
• Publication : REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
• Publisher : Rev Int Organ
• Volume : 17(3)
• Date : September, 2021

Abstract: Do voters reward politicians for trade liberalization? We examine this question by analyzing voter responses in South Korea to the US-Korea Trade Agreement. Exploiting a change in party positions on the FTA over time, we examine the effects of different party positions on outcomes in the legislative and presidential elections. We find that voters who expect direct gains (losses) specifically from the treaty increase (decrease) support for the pro-trade party. However, voters in export-oriented industries do not reward politicians for a free trade agreement that does not directly affect their well-being. Our analysis of seven waves of individual-level panel survey data also demonstrates that a short-term change in a candidate’s position on the FTA influences voter decisions in the upcoming presidential election. The findings suggest that voter preferences with regard to trade can materialize into voting behavior when voters have a clear ex ante expectation of specific gains or losses from the trade policy.

• Author : Dong Joon Park
• Publication : THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
• Publisher : The East Asian Association Of International Studies (Eaais)
• Volume : 24(3)
• Date : September, 2021

Abstract: Why do states sometimes back down during crises despite the risk of harming their reputation for resolve, a key political asset considered vital to successful deterrence? To address this question, this article argues that under specific conditions, states and leaders consider a moderate, rather than a strong reputation, more suited to its foreign policy objectives and national security and thus opt to deliberately back down accordingly. In particular, actors are likely to prefer a moderate reputation when there is increasing concern about the increasing costs of deterrence caused by escalation across crises, and when they prioritize the process of negotiations over its eventual outcome and seek to induce the participation of their adversary. Case studies of the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, with particular focus on why the Eisenhower administration chose to back down during the second crisis in 1958, confirms the main argument of this article.

• Author : Dong Joon Park
• Publication : The Journal of Asiatic Studies
• Publisher : Asiatic Research Institute
• Volume : 64(3)
• Date : September, 2021

Abstract: How has US grand strategy and America’s attitude towards alliances and multilateralism evolved in the post-Cold War era? This article proposes a framework based on the two primary functions of US alliances to analyze its foreign policy. I argue that while the grand strategy of deep engagement has been pervasive in American foreign policy, differences emerge when examining whether each US administration prioritized either the security-maximizing or norm-spreading function of alliances. With the exception of President Clinton, all other US Presidents focused on the former which, in turn, has led to a more consistent foreign policy than conventionally understood. Meanwhile, a recent trend observed in both the Obama and Trump administrations has been America’s desire to share the burden of maintaining the liberal international order (LIO) with others. Combined, America’s approach to alliances and multilaralism has transitioned from being supply-driven to demand-driven in an attempt to induce institutional buy-in from allies favoring the current international system. The recent success of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) provides further evidence for these claims. Such a shift in US views on multilateralism will present both challenges and opportunities for South Korea as it navigates the emerging New Cold War in the Asia-Pacific.

• Author : Shin Wha Lee
• Publication : ifs post
• Publisher : K-policy  Brief
• Volume : no.31
• Date : September, 2021

• Author : Sung Eun Kim, Joonseok Yang
• Publication : AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH
• Publisher : online first
• Volume : 50(3)
• Date : August, 2021

Abstract: Gasoline prices are often a heated topic during presidential election campaigns in the United States. Yet, presidents have limited control over gasoline prices. Do voters reward or punish the president for changes in gasoline prices? Why might voters blame the president for an outcome beyond direct presidential control? This study addresses these questions by testing the effects of gasoline prices on pocketbook retrospection by voters. To capture the personal economic burden of gasoline prices, we rely on average driving times to work, given the inelastic nature of gasoline consumption for commuting. The results provide evidence for pocketbook voting: constituencies with longer average driving times to work are more likely to hold the president accountable for gasoline price increases. These findings have broader implications regarding electoral accountability and rationality in voting.

• Author : Nam Kyu Kim, Jun Koga Sudduth
• Publication : Comparative Political Studies
• Publisher : SAGE Publications
• Volume : 54(9)
• Date : August, 2021

Abstract: Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by diminishing the risk of coups? We posit that the effectiveness of political institutions in deterring coups crucially depends on the types of plotters and their political goals. By providing a means to address the ruling coalition’s primary concerns about a dictator’s opportunism or incompetence, institutions reduce the necessity of reshuffling coups, in which the ruling coalition replaces an incumbent leader but keeps the regime intact. However, such institutions do not diminish the risk of regime-changing coups, because the plotters’ goals of overthrowing the entire regime and changing the group of ruling coalition are not achievable via activities within the institutions. Our empirical analysis provides strong empirical support for our expectations. Our findings highlight that the role of “democratic” institutions in deterring coups is rather limited as it only applies to less than 38% of coup attempts.

• Author : Peng, W., Kim, S.E., Purohit, P., Urpelainen, J., & Wagner,F. 
• Publication : ONE EARTH
• Publisher : Elsevier Inc.
• Volume : 4
• Date : August, 2021

Abstract: Political-feasibility concerns are at the center of real-world air-pollution policymaking. Yet, these concerns are often not represented in leading decision-support tools that have been used for assessing policies’ environmental impacts. Focusing on a wide range of clean-air policies in India, we assess their political-feasibility scores on the basis of public opinion, market, and institutional considerations and then incorporate these scores into the evaluation of environmental impacts by using an integrated assessment model (GAINS-South Asia). We demonstrate that although some policies with substantial potential to mitigate air pollution are also highly politically feasible (e.g., replacing solid fuels with cleaner fuels in households), others can be less politically feasible (e.g., banning agricultural waste burning). Because some clean-air policies co-reduce CO2 emissions and aerosols, considering varying degrees of political feasibility is particularly important in achieving air-pollution and climate objectives simultaneously because of its implications on the implementation scale and policy sequence.

• Author : Dong Joon Park
• Publication : Journal of Peace and Unification
• Publisher : Ewha Institute of Unification Studies
• Volume : 11(3)
• Date : August, 2021

Abstract: How do great powers manage their alliances with smaller states? Despite the risk of en-trapment, crises may also be perceived as opportunities to gain private information about others. Based on this logic, I argue that both status quo and revisionist powers uncertain about the system either welcome or condone belligerent behavior by their smaller allies and thus loosely manage their relationships. Certain revisionist powers also consider crises beneficial due to this dynamic, but oversee the action of their protégés more closely to prevent it from interfering with their own strategy to revise the system. In contrast, certain status quo powers most closely control their client allies to prevent entrapment. In other words, uncertainty causes great powers to wag their tails.