The Role of Reputation for Resolve in Crisis Decision-Making: On the Cases of the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s (2021.09)
- Author : Dong Joon Park
- Publication : THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
- Publisher : The East Asian Association Of International Studies (Eaais)
- Volume : 24(3)
- Date : September, 2021
Abstract: Why do states sometimes back down during crises despite the risk of harming their reputation for resolve, a key political asset considered vital to successful deterrence? To address this question, this article argues that under specific conditions, states and leaders consider a moderate, rather than a strong reputation, more suited to its foreign policy objectives and national security and thus opt to deliberately back down accordingly. In particular, actors are likely to prefer a moderate reputation when there is increasing concern about the increasing costs of deterrence caused by escalation across crises, and when they prioritize the process of negotiations over its eventual outcome and seek to induce the participation of their adversary. Case studies of the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, with particular focus on why the Eisenhower administration chose to back down during the second crisis in 1958, confirms the main argument of this article.