The Principles of Institutional Design through The 1987 Constitutional System of Korea – Focusing on Representativeness, Effectiveness and Accountability(2019. 12)
2019.12.02
- Authors : Hyun-Jae Ho
- Journal : Journal of Parliamentary Research
- Publisher : The Korea Parliamentary Research Institute
- Volume : 14(2)
- Publication Date : December, 2019
- Abstract :This paper analyzes the 1987 constitutional system by focusing on representativeness, effectiveness and accountability which can be called the core principles of institutional design. The results of the analysis are as follows. Firstly, the 1987 constitutional system was focused on functional efficiency based on a thorough winner-take-all while excluding representativeness in its formation. Secondly, it failed to establish accountability as well as the intended efficiency in the outcome. What we have confirmed from these two facts is that the crisis of the 1987 constitutional system is not just a matter of the operation of the system, but a more fundamental problem stemming from the inconsistency of institutional combination based on the principles of the system’s institutional design. Thus, the alternative system should begin by considering the combination of the principles of effectiveness and consequential accountability on representativeness that can be combined in a mutually virtuous cycle and produce desirable outcomes. One such combination at this stage can be a combination of proportional representation and parliamentary system. Because it allows us to transform a weak party system into a strong party system in that the interests in society are properly represented through political parties and fair competition is achieved, while also training the political party as the primary organization of democratic accountability. And this naturally leads to accountability through the very mechanism of institutional combination.