Electoral System and Trade Openness in Government Procurement Market (2020. 06)

• Author :  Dong-Hun Kim
• Journal : 21st Century Political Science Review
• Publisher : The 21st Century Political Science Association
• Volume : 30(2)
• Publication Date : June 2020
• DOI: 10.17937/topsr.30.2.202006.147

Abstract : The article examines the effects of electoral system on the propensity to open up the government procurement market to foreign competition. Foreign discrimination in government procurement market is an non-tariff barrier that has different political dynamics compared to the conventional trade barriers. In a public procurement market, unlike in private markets, a government faces different incentives because it is also a market participant as well as a market regulator. By focusing on this dilemma, this article argues that various components of electoral system induce government to either open up or close the procurement market to foreign competition. Empirically, it finds support for the effects of district magnitude, allocation rule on the propensity to open up the procurement market.