From Balance of Terror to Balance of Prudence: A Theoretical Analysis for Nuclear Arms Control Between the U.S. and North Korea (2023.06)
- Author : Inwook Kim, Seung Joon Paik
- Publication : Korean Political Science Review
- Publisher : The Korean Political Science Association
- Volume : 57(2)
- Date : June 2023
The possibility of nuclear arms control with North Korea, which was previously deemed implausible and unacceptable, is gaining traction among analysts and policymakers. What is missing, however, is proper engagement with theories of nuclear arms control and studies about its relevance to asymmetric nuclear relationships. This paper seeks to fill this gap by first distinguishing between structural and operational arms control, elucidating their rationale, organizing principles, and expected outcomes. Second, because nuclear asymmetry defines and dominates the US-North Korea nuclear tension, structural nuclear arms control is practically impossible to design and politically too costly. On the other hand, nuclear asymmetry exacerbates crisis stability problem, and operational nuclear arms control can provide meaningful crisis management mechanisms with relatively acceptable cost.