[Soodang Security Studies Colloquium #8] The Dictator’s Island of Excellence: Contrasting Outcomes of the Nuclear Weapons Program between North Korea and Iraq
• Date and Time: May 28, 2021 / 5PM
• Presenter: Kyung Joo Jeon (KIDA)
• Discussant: Yeon Jung Ji (HUFS)
• Organized by: Peace & Democracy Institute, Department of Political Science and International Relations
In Colooquium, Dr. Kyung Joo Jeon released a working paper called The Dictator’s Island of Excellence: Contrasting Outcomes of the Nuclear Weapons Program between North Korea and Iraq. Since the end of World War II, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, and many other countries have tried to develop nuclear weapons, and very few of themselves. Among the many cases of nuclear development attempts and subsequent failures, the author noted the failure of individual dictatorships. Previous studies in Iraq and Libya have shown that individual dictatorships will never succeed in nuclear development based on structural and institutional incompetence that adversely affects nuclear development, such as the “principal-agent problem” (nominal system and political personnel). And this view underestimated the possibility of success, pointing out the individual dictatorial nature of North Korea in the early 2000s when it attempted to develop nuclear weapons. However, North Korea has shown exceptional signs of successful nuclear upgrading since its first nuclear test in 2006. Therefore, the author aims to identify the success factors of North Korea’s nuclear development.
Accordingly, the author argues that North Korea’s release of nuclear organizations and experts from the typical political restrictions of its individual dictatorship is a major factor in its success in nuclear development.Unlike Iraq and Libya, which were previous failures, North Korea separated its nuclear development organization from the existing party and political organization, and continued to adhere to these principles during the process, while giving it the necessary powers. In the process of organizing nuclear development organizations, they also hired experts from South Korea and abroad to hand over the full power of nuclear development organizations to individual dictatorships. At the same time, the most unique thing is that we have established independent and professional specialized educational institutions to train the experts necessary for nuclear development. This is a remarkable part of North Korea’s society, an individual dictatorship and an equality-oriented communist regime, and it was also a representative evidence of how strong and competent North Korea is in nuclear development. In addition, the author interviews many North Korean defectors who worked in the party, military and scientific organizations, while attempting to combine media data in the North to provide new primary data for North Korean research, showing that North Korea’s success in nuclear development is no accident.