[Soodang Security Studies Colloquium #16] The Soviet Failure to Restrain the Chinese Nuclear Armament

• Date and Time: January 21, 2022 / 5PM
• Presenters: Dong Sun Lee (Political Science and International Relations, Korea University) / Iordanka Alexandrova (Peace & Democracy Institute, Korea University)
• Discussant: Sergey Radchenko (Johns Hopkins University, SAIS)
• Organized by: Peace & Democracy Institute, Department of Political Science and International Relations

On January 21, 2022, Korea University’s Korea University’s Peace & Democracy Institute held the 16th Soodang Security Studies Colloquium.

Professor Dong Sun Lee of the Department of PSIR at Korea University and Dr. Iordanka Alexandrova of PDI participated as presenters, and Sergey Radchenko of Johns Hopkins University participated as a debater.

In Colloquium, the author released his first draft, <The Soviet Failure to Restrain the Chinese Nuclear Armament>. In response to the nuclear threat faced by the United States during the Korean War in 1953, China wanted the support of the Soviet Union’s nuclear technology, which was an ally of the superpower and succeeded in possessing nuclear weapons, but the Soviet Union approached it in many ways. So, China’s nuclear armament in 1964 was a shocking event not only for many of the First World countries sitting on the other side of the Cold War, but also for the Soviet Union, which was the same communist camp and ally.

In response, the author analyzed the Soviet Union’s policy of deterrence against nuclear armament by asking a research question, “Why was the Soviet Union’s failure to curb China’s nuclear armament?” According to the author, the main reason why the Soviet Union failed to contain China’s nuclear armament stems from the background of the Cold War era, the geographical requirements of neighboring countries and the polar regime. First, if you look at the geographical requirements of both countries, the Soviet Union and China were countries that shared a long border with each other. Thus, the threat of punishment to curb China’s nuclear armament was likely to lose credibility because it threatened serious disruption in the region adjacent to China and the core interests of the Soviet Union itself. This geographical proximity also made Beijing afraid of being subjugated by its neighboring superpower neighbors, and made it hesitant to exchange security guarantees and nuclear armament by the Soviet Union. In addition, the international system of polarization gave China a good reason to worry about future political subjugation, especially as China relied on the Soviet Union for security and economic reasons. Therefore, the author points out that these two conditions at international levels were that the Soviet Union’s nuclear disarmament policy could not be effective against China.