• 저자 : Doo-Jin Kim
• 학술지명 : 국제정치연구
• 발행처 : 동아시아국제제정치학회
• 권호 : Vol.24 No.1
• 게재년월 : 2021년 03월

초록 :  탈영토화를 겨냥한 세계화의 진행이 민족주의의 희석화를 가져올 것이라는 예상과는 달리, 온라인 공간을 통해 민족주의가 증폭되는 현상이 빈번히 목격되고 있다. 특히 온라인공간의 언술(narratives)을 통해 한국-중국 간에는 영토, 역사, 사회문화 영역을 둘러싸고‘집단기억’으로 인해, 여타 국제사회와 구별되는 특이한 갈등 양상을 보이고 있다. 이러한동아시아 민족주의의 ‘재영토화’를 ‘감정레짐’(emotional regime)의 맥락에서 새롭게 규명되어야 할 필요가 있다. 그 동안 사회과학은 일반적으로 ‘반감정주의’ 편견(anti-emotioal bias) 의 시각을 취해 왔다. 감정은 ‘합리성/합리주의’로부터 벗어난 ‘변형’ 내지 ‘일탈’로 보는 이분법적 논리가 지배적이었다. 한중간의 배타적, 적대적, 및 독선적인 민족주의 정서의 표출은 그동안 예외적인 혹은 병리적인 현상으로 간주되어 왔다. 이제 ‘기억의 과잉’에 의한동아시아 민족주의- 오프라인 혹은 온라인 이든-의 정치화 현상을 비합리적 일탈로 보기 보다는 ‘감정의 합리성’의 논거에 의해 재조명되어야 할 것이다.

• 저자 : Doo-Jin Kim
• 학술지명 : Journal of Peace and Unification
• 발행처 : 이화여자대학교 통일학연구원
• 권호 : Vol.11 No.1
• 게재년월 : 2021년 02월

초록 : This study examines the controversies over the policy decision of shutting down the Kae-song Industrial Complex in 2016. Drawing on “Multiple Streams Framework” the paper analyzes the policy transition of the shutting down the Kaesong Industrial Complex through the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. Here, we are focused on the “policy entrepreneur” who plays a dynamic, and active role in terms of coupling the “unexpected” stream in policy calculation. The previous argument that the decision to shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex was a “unilateral or arbitrary decision” by President Park Geun-hye needs to be reconsidered. We argue that the policy entrepreneur (e.g., the President) paved the way to ‘unpredictable,’ ‘nonlinear,’ and ‘unexpected’ policy output.

• 저자 : Nam Kyu Kim
• 학술지명 : Journal of Conflict Resolution
• 발행처 : Sage Publications
• 권호 : 65(2-3)
• 게재년월 : 2021년 02월

초록 : Existing scholarship shows that a history of military rule increases the risk of democratic breakdown. However, scholars overlook the fact that military rule takes two distinct forms: collegial and personalist military rule. I argue that the two types of military rule provide different structural settings for post-authoritarian contexts. Collegial military rule hands over more cohesive and hierarchical militaries to their subsequent democracies than personalist military rule. These militaries remain organized, politicized, and powerful in emerging democracies, which increases the risk of military intervention and coups. I hypothesize that collegial military rule poses a greater threat to the survival of the ensuing democracies than personalist military rule. Empirical analysis reveals that democracies after collegial military rule are more likely to collapse than other democracies, including those emerging from personalist military rule. This shows that the previous finding on the detrimental effect of military rule is largely driven by collegial military rule.

• 저자 : Sung Eun Kim & Yotam Margalit
• 학술지명 : International Organization
• 발행처 : Cambridge University Press
• 권호 : First View
• 게재년월 : 2021년 1월
• 초록 : In response to President Trump instigating conflict over trade with China, the Chinese government countered by issuing tariffs on thousands of products worth over USD 110 billion in US exports. We explore whether China’s tariffs reflected a strategy to apply counterpressure by hurting political support for the president’s party. We also assess the strategy’s impact on the 2018 midterm elections and examine the mechanism underlying the resulting electoral shift. We find strong evidence that Chinese tariffs systematically targeted US goods that had production concentrated in Republican-supporting counties, particularly when located in closely contested Congressional districts. This apparent strategy was successful: targeted areas were more likely to turn against Republican candidates. Using data on campaign communications, local search patterns online, and an original national survey, we find evidence that voters residing in areas affected by the tariffs were more likely to learn about the trade war, recognize its adverse impact, and assign the Republicans responsibility for the escalating dispute. These findings demonstrate how domestic political institutions can be a source of vulnerability in interstate disputes.