[수당 해외학자 초청 콜로키움 #17] Capitol Controls: Migration and Congressional Oversight of International Organizations

• 발표: Adrian Shin (University of Colorado Boulder), “Capitol Controls: Migration and Congressional Oversight of International Organizations”
• 일시: 2023년 1월 11일 (수요일) l 11:00 ~ 12:30
• 장소: 정경관 412호

2023년 1월 11일 고려대학교 정치외교학과와 평화와 민주주의 연구소는 Adrian Shin 교수를 초청하여 수당 해외학자 콜로키움을 개최하였습니다. Shin 교수는 University of Colorado Boulder에서 국제정치경제에 대한 연구를 진행하고 있습니다. 이번 콜로키움에서는 “Capitol Controls: Migration and Congressional Oversight of International Organizations” 제목의 논문을 발표하고 세션 참여자들과 질의를 주고받았습니다.

초록

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has operated at the center of global economic governance through its backing of the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. However, since U.S. financing of the Fund and the World Bank ultimately depends on the acquiescence of Congress, the capacity of these institutions remains tightly linked to domestic politics. In this article, we revisit the domestic roots of congressional support for the funding of the IMF and the World Bank. Whereas past research emphasizes the role of financial interests and political ideology in guiding congressional preferences, we highlight policymakers’ racial attitudes and fears about immigration as equally salient drivers. Specifically, we posit that racially conservative lawmakers whose districts face disproportionately high levels of migrant pressure are more likely to support congressional funding for the IMF and the World Bank. These international financial institutions are built to alleviate poverty and economic distress within the major migrant-sending countries of the U.S.,and increasing the resources of these institutions can mitigate immigration flows. We evaluate this claim using a dataset of House votes on funding the international financial institutions during five congressional sessions (95th, 96th, 98th, 103rd, and 105th).